NOTE
ANTITRUST RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE
SECRET LICENSING: A LEGAL REVIEW
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

Laissez-faire economics postulates that in a free market system in which
there are many producers struggling independently to satisfy the demands of
innumerable consumers, an invisible hand guides the producers to produce
the goods and services that consumers desire most in the greatest quantities
and at the lowest cost. In this ideal economic state postulated by Adam Smith,
the determination of what to produce, how much, and for whom, is the result
of the aggregation of an infinite number of miniscule purchasing agreements
between competing producers and consumers. The result of perfect
competition is an allocation of scarce productive resources such that no
possible reallocation could increase consumer welfare.
In the real world, however, a lack of complete information about
consumers' demands and producers' products, and limitations on the mobility
of productive resources, prevent attainment of this economic utopia.
Furthermore, the small number and large size of producers and consumers,
respectively, as well as differentiation of products and productive resources,
enable individual purchasing contracts to affect the allocation of resources.
Thus, there may be a conflict between the goals of contracting parties seeking
to maximize their own welfare and the goals of social welfare economics. For
example, a contract between a firm that possesses secret information about an
industrial process and a firm that would like to obtain and use that
information may have an effect on the allocation of productive resources.
That effect may be to induce greater expenditure for the generation of useful
industrial information, or it may simply be to increase the wealth of the firms
possessing that information without any collateral benefit to society.
One purpose of antitrust law is to minimize the conflict between the
welfare maximizing goals of individual firms and those of society as a whole by
regulating the terms of contracts. A trade secret license is one type of
contract that is subject to antitrust regulation. This note will survey the legal
treatment that has been accorded various trade secret license terms under the
antitrust laws (Part IV), and then will analyze that legal treatment in view of
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economic analyses that have been applied to antitrust regulation of patent
licensing agreements (Part V). As a background to these inquiries, the nature
of trade secret protection will be discussed in Part II, and trade secret
licensing agreements will be described in Part III.
II
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR TRADE SECRETS

To understand trade secret licensing and to analyze the antitrust
limitations that have been placed on restrictive clauses in licensing
agreements, it is helpful to examine the nature of the legal rights being
licensed.
A trade secret is a legal interest in business or technical information,
which, like other intangible property rights, entitles the holder to possession
and use of the information. Trade secrets are often equated with know-how,
which consists of everything that is required to start up a business excluding
labor and tangible capital.' Unlike federally protected intellectual property,
which includes patents, trademarks, and copyrights, trade secrets are not
represented by any document of registration. Although recognized by federal
law, 2 trade secrets are protected only by state law. Most states recognize the
definition of a trade secret provided by comment b of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula
for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving
materials, a pattern for a machine or other device or a list of customers .... 3

A similar definition was approved by the drafters of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and (ii) is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
4
maintain its secrecy.

A few aspects of trade secret law are worthy of elaboration. The basis for
protecting a trade secret is the natural or common law right to the fruits of
1. Macdonald, Know-how Licensing and the Anti-trust Laws, 62 MICH. L. REV. 351, 355 (1964).
2. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1) (1982); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(o (1982); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 78x(b) (1982);
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1982) (criminalizing federal employees' disclosure of trade secrets); see
Oppenheim, The Patent-Antitrust Spectrum of Patent and Know-how License Limitations: Accommodation?
Conflict? or Antitrust Supremacy?, 15 IDEA 1, 22 (1971).
3. See 12 R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01, at 2-3 to
2-13 (1986).
4. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1979) may be found in 12B R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, at appendix A (1986). For a list of states that have
adopted the Act with or without modifications, see id. at appendix AA.
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one's labor. 5 The property right subsists only as long as the information
sought to be protected remains secret. 6 Secrecy need not be absolute, and, as
indicated by the Uniform Act definition, depends on the owner's efforts to
keep his proprietary information confidential. Although there is no explicit
novelty prerequisite to protection of a trade secret, secrecy implies a
minimum degree of novelty. Information that is generally known in the trade
cannot be secret. The value of a trade secret may be measured by the
investment of time, labor, and money expended to create the know-how and
7
prevent its revelation to competitors.
Trade secrets or know-how are distinguishable from patents in several
respects. First, the scope of material covered by trade secret law is broader
than that which may be patented. For example, trade secret law would likely
protect the data obtained by repeated routine experiments requiring
significant expenditure of time and effort. Regardless of the abilities of the
data to determine the most efficient method of carrying out an industrial
process or business practice, such data would probably not satisfy the novelty
and non-obviousness requirements of the patent law, although such knowhow can form the backbone and structure of a business. 8
The second and most important difference between trade secret and
patent law is the greater degree of protection offered by patent law. A patent
is a legal monopoly against the entire world, 9 while a trade secret confers
rights only against those with whom the owner has contracted, expressly or by
implication, or those who obtain the secret by improper means. ' 0 An example
of improper means of discovery of a competitor's secret process would be to
fly over and take a photograph of his manufacturing plant while it is under
construction.' I Thus, trade secret law, unlike a patent, "cannot be used as an
offensive weapon" to interfere with the business operations of others who
obtain or use the trade secret without incurring a contractual obligation to the
owner or engaging in tortious acts. 1 2 Discovery of a trade secret by
5. R. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES INCLUDING TRADE SECRETS § 3, at 2 (2d ed.
1943); see Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889).
6. R. ELLIS, supra note 5, at § 2, at 2.
7. See id. § 10, at 16; Arnold, Basic Considerations in Licensing, in ABA SECTION OF PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LICENSING
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS].

13 (1981) [hereinafter ABA

8. See, e.g., Choisser Research Corp. v. Electronic Vision Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q 234, 235 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego Co. 1972) (a trade secret may consist of production techniques or know-how

that even a good mechanic could develop).
9. The patent law rewards inventors with a 17-year exclusive right, enforceable in federal court,
to make, use, and sell the patented invention, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982), in return for disclosure to the
public of a description of the invention and of the manner and process of using it which enables any
person skilled in the art to make and use it, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
10. R. ELLIS, supra note 5, at § 3, at 3; Allen-Qualley Co. v. Shellmar Prod. Co., 31 F.2d 293, 296
(D. Ill.), afjd, 36 F.2d 263 (7th Cir. 1929).
11. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1024 (1970).
12. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 354.
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independent invention, accidental disclosure, or reverse engineering is not
13
actionable.
The purpose of trade secret law is to maintain standards of commercial
ethics and to encourage invention. The Supreme Court held in Kewanee Oil
Co. v. Bicron Corp. 14 that Congress' power under the Constitution "to promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts"' 5 is not exclusive. States may act
to protect inventions as long as state laws do not conflict with the operation
16
and purpose of the federal patent law.
Patent and trade secret protection are mutually exclusive. Under the
statutory bar of 35 United States Code section 102(b),' 7 an inventor must
apply for a patent within one year of reducing his invention to practice for
commercial advantage; otherwise he forfeits patent protection. If a patent
issues, the information disclosed in the specification is public and no longer
protectable by trade secret law. Until a patent issues, or if the application is
rejected, however, the Patent Office is obligated not to disclose the subject
matter,' 8 and the applicant is still entitled to trade secret protection, if the
information has not otherwise been disclosed.
Recently there has been increased interest in state trade secret law as a
form of intellectual property protection for computer software and
biotechnological inventions due to the inadequacy or disadvantages of federal
copyright and patent law for these types of innovation.' 9 Patent protection is
often legally unavailable for computer software because of the Supreme
Court's position that a mathematical algorithm, apart from any patentable
industrial process, is not patentable.2 0 The fact that copyright protects only
the expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves suggests that a copyright
may be inadequate protection for computer software. A copyright cannot be
used to prevent decompiling, disassembling, or reverse-compiling machinereadable to human-readable code in order to discover the functional aspects
of the software, which represent its real value. 2 1 The ideas that are expressed

13. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Reverse engineering means
starting with the lawfully acquired known product and working backward to find the method by which
it was developed. Commissioners' Comment to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, in 12B R. MILGRIM,
supra note 4, at A-7.
14. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
16. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 479.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
18. Id. § 122.
19. Dratler, Trade Secret Law: An Impediment to Trade in Computer Software, I SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27,42 (1985); Karny, Biotechnology Licensing, 8 LICENSING L. & Bus. REP.
1, 5 (1985).
20. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (algorithm for converting decimal to binary code);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (method for calculating an alarm limit); cf Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175 (1981) (method for molding rubber which used Arrhenius equation).
21. Dratler, supra note 19, at 38; Harris, A Market-Oriented Approach to the Use of Trade Secret or
Copyright Protection (or Both?)for Software, 25 JURIMETRICS J. 147, 157, 169 (1985).
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in a computer program may be protected as trade secrets, however, and the
22
above processes may be prohibited in a software license.
Trade secret protection may be more desirable than patent protection for
biotechnological inventions because deposit of a culture of an organism that
constitutes part of a patent claim may be necessary to satisfy the enabling
disclosure requirement of 35 United States Code section 112.23 If such
deposit in a recognized culture collection is required, the culture must be
made available to the public without restriction for at least thirty years after
the patent issues. 24 When the biotechnologist deposits a microorganism that
he has invented, he has relinquished control of "the factory instead ofjust the
plans for constructing it."25 The right to possess the microorganism is
significantly more valuable than the corresponding intangible intellectual
property rights; hence the owner may prefer to rely on trade secret law rather
than to obtain a patent.
Having examined the nature of trade secret rights and the comparative
protection provided by the patent law, this note proceeds to a discussion of
licensing.
III
INTRODUCTION To TRADE SECRET LICENSING

The owner of a trade secret has the exclusive right to use it in his business
as long as the information remains secret and no one else discovers it
independently by legitimate means. The owner's disclosure of his trade
secret is a de facto license to use the information, since apart from secrecy, the
owner has no exclusive rights. Therefore when the trade secret owner
licenses his trade secret, the consideration paid by the trade secret licensee is
really in exchange for disclosure, not for use, as in the case of a patent
license. 26 In contrast to the patent licensee, the trade secret licensee is often
uncertain of the usefulness and value of the licensed information until after
his contractual obligation to pay consideration has begun. Since trade secret
law will not protect whatever enters the public domain with sale of the
product, a potential licensee must bargain for disclosure knowing that third
22. Dratler, supra note 19, at 48. Trade secret protection for computer software is not without
uncertainty, however. First, compliance with the copyright law requirement that a copy of the
protected work be deposited in the Library of Congress, 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1982), may be deemed a
public disclosure, negating secrecy. In addition, placing a copyright notice on licensed copies of the
software may constitute an implied admission that the software has been published. Second, absent
an enforceable contract prohibiting a licensee from analyzing licensed software, trade secret law
would not protect against reverse engineering. Finally, section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act may
preempt state law protection for computer software. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982). See Dratler, supra
note 19, at 38, 45; Harris, supra note 21, at 157.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
24. F. BEIER, R. CRESPI & J. STRAUS, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT PROTECTION, AN
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 57-58 (1985).
25.
26.

(1971).

Karny, supra note 19, at 2.
Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton:

Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 17, 30
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parties may discover the trade secret and have the advantage of royalty-free
use.

2 7

Like a patent license, a trade secret license confers no affirmative rights; a
license is merely a withholding of the licensor's right to bring action against
the licensee under either state trade secret law or federal patent law, as the
case may be. 28 Just as the patent licensor is permitted to relinquish only part
of his right to bring an infringement action against anyone who makes, uses,
or sells the patented invention, 29 the trade secret licensor may relinquish only
part of his right under state law to bring action for misappropriation, use, or
disclosure of the secret. Furthermore, the trade secret licensor may extract
from his licensee, as part of the consideration for the license, restrictions on
the right to use the information disclosed. The aim of this note is to analyze
the antitrust law limitations on this contractual right to bargain for and agree
on trade secret license restrictions.
The following is a simple example of a trade secret license:
Licensor hereby agrees to furnish to licensee during the term hereof engineering and
manufacturing services and techniques, which include specifications, drawings,
equipment designs and circuitry, cost breakdowns, operations descriptions and other
information necessary
to enable licensee to manufacture licensor's products covered
30
by this agreement.

As the above example shows, the disclosure to the licensee may take various
forms. Often a license agreement transfers other tangible and intangible
property in addition to the trade secret, such as personnel, equipment,
patents, and trademarks. The substance of licensing agreements depends on
the characteristics of the particular technology being licensed and the needs
31
of the business which exploits it.

The proprietor of valuable technology will license another firm to exploit
his technology when the proprietor is unable or unwilling to enter a new
market himself. A firm or educational institution engaged in research may
lack the capital to implement its research and must license others in order to
make a profit. Even a firm that would be capable of exploiting its newly
developed technology might not want to incur the risk of making the capital
expenditure necessary to produce and market the good or service that it
developed. For the firm wishing to enter a foreign market, licensing may be
the only feasible option; tariffs and quotas may render exportation
uneconomical, and, aside from a prohibitively large capital outlay, there may
be foreign legal restrictions to direct foreign investment in manufacturing
facilities.3 2 Licensing gives the licensor the opportunity to derive additional
income from intangible property through royalties and gives the licensee the
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Arnold, supra note 7, at 19-20.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982); see Arnold, supra note 7, at 19-20.
Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1971).

31.

Kiley, Biotechnology: Evolution of a New Venture and its Licensing Strategy, in A.B.A. RECENT

DEVELOPMENTS,

32.

A.B.A.

supra note 7, at 106.

ANTITRUST SECTION,
PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING 2

MONOGRAPH No. 6, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
(1981) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH].
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opportunity to use its existing distribution system to market the products of a

3s
technology to which it would not otherwise have access.
The decision to license technology is influenced by the owner's market
structure; the factors that he considers include the nature, number, and
geographic distribution of his competitors; the number of different
applications for the technology; the positions in the market structure
occupied by the owner and his potential licensee; and any perceived trends in
that market structure. 34 Other important considerations are the capital and
labor needed for starting up; the requirements for distribution and sales of
the products of the licensed technology; and the nature of the technology,
35
since it affects whether local trade secret law will protect the owner's rights.
Before the Supreme Court decisions in Kewanee Oil and Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co., 3 6 the validity of licenses enforceable under state trade secret
law had been uncertain with regard to the exclusivity of congressional power
and the supremacy of federal patent law. This uncertainty is evidenced by a
federal district court decision invalidating a trade secret licensing agreement
in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., on grounds that patent law policy prohibited
contracts for compensation for use of secret ideas that had not been
submitted to the patent office. 3 7 The Kewanee decision, however, confirmed
the court of appeals reversal in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc. 38 Although federal
law may require that all ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the
common good, 3 9 it does not require that all ideas be placed in general
circulation. 40 Rather, the trade secret owner "may keep his invention secret
and reap its fruits indefinitely. "41
In Aronson, the Supreme Court further clarified the validity of licenses
enforceable under state trade secret law. It enforced the royalty obligation of
a licensee who agreed to pay a patent applicant a reduced percentage of sales
if the application was denied. 4 2 This decision stands in contrast to previous
holdings that a patentee may not require payment of royalties beyond the
term of a patent, 4 3 nor after a patent has been held invalid. 4 4 The Aronson

33. Id. at 1.
34. Arnold, supra note 7, at 6.
35. Id. For a discussion of the special considerations of trade secret licensors in the computer
software and biotechnology industries, see Harris, supra note 21, at 150-52; Karny, supra note 19, at
1-2.
36. 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
37. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Milgrim, supra note 26, at

20.
38. 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
39. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969).
40. Painton & Co., 442 F.2d at 225.
41. Id. (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, dec. amended, 289 U.S.
706 (1933)); cf Lear, Inc., 395 U.S. at 677 (Black, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Douglas, J.,
dissenting, wrote, "[N]o state has the right to authorize any kind of monopoly on what is claimed to
be a new invention ... ").
42. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 259 (1979). The licensor agreed to a 5%
royalty if a patent was issued and a 2.5% royalty if no patent was issued.
43. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
44. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 672 (1969) (suspending licensee's royalty obligation
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Court held that the licensee's royalty obligation was independent of federal
law. Even though the licensed design could be easily copied and the
licensee's competitors were free of any royalty obligation, requiring the
licensee to pay royalties was not inconsistent with the patent law. 4 5
Having examined what trade secret owners seek to achieve through
licensing and determined that enforcement of trade secret license agreements
is not unconstitutional nor contrary to federal law, this note now proceeds to
a discussion of several antitrust challenges to various trade secret license
provisions.
IV
ANTITRUST VALIDITY OF TRADE SECRET LICENSE RESTRICTIONS

The owner of secret technology has the right to exploit that technology
and maintain its secrecy indefinitely without incurring liability under the
antitrust laws. "[A] firm may normally keep its innovations secret from its
rivals as long as it wishes, forcing them to catch up on the strength of their
own efforts after the new product is introduced .... -46 Even an arbitrary and
discriminatory refusal to license proprietary technology would likely not
violate section 2 of the Sherman Act. 4 7 When the owner of proprietary
information does enter an agreement to disclose that information in exchange
for consideration, the parties to the license are bound by the provisions of
section 1 of the Sherman Act: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... -48 Often,
however, the trade secret owner or his potential licensee is unwilling to enter
a license agreement unless it provides for certain restrictions. Such
restrictions include limitations on the territories within which the licensor or
licensee is permitted to use the licensed know-how, requirements that the
licensee purchase materials or services from the licensor, restriction on price
and output, requirements that the licensee disclose any know-how it develops
while using the licensed process, and restrictions on the technical fields for
which the licensee may use the licensed trade secret. The following
discussion will focus on the first three limitations listed above, since they have
received the greatest judicial attention. 49 The discussion will be preceded,
during the time patent validity is being challenged in court).
45. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 263.
46. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444

U.S. 1093 (1980) (citing Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)).
47. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1072 (3d Cir. 1979). The
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), provides, "[Elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a

felony ....
48.
49.
Need for
output,

"

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, Antitrust and the InternationalLicensing of Trade Secrets and Know-How: A
Guidelines, 9 L. & POL'v INT'L Bus. 725, 738 (1977). These authors conjecture that price,
and field-of-use restrictions would be permissible in circumstances where territorial
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however, by an examination of the antitrust limitations placed on the term
during which the trade secret licensor may demand royalties from his licensee.
A.

Royalty Term

The issue of the permissible royalty term under a trade secret license has
arisen in two distinct contexts. Where the subject matter of a license
agreement is protected purely by trade secret law, challenges to the
agreement are often brought by the licensee after the trade secret has become
available to the licensee's competitors. Where a license agreement pertains to
a mixture of patent and trade secret protected information, the licensor often
claims that know-how supports the royalty obligation after the patents have
expired or have been held invalid.
The validity of the royalty term of a license involving only trade secrets is
purely a matter of contract law; any term freely agreed upon by the licensor
and licensee is enforceable. 50 If the parties fail to stipulate when a royalty
obligation should terminate, the court will not imply such a term but will
enforce the obligation as long as the licensee uses the trade secret. 5 1 WarnerLambert v. John F. Reynolds, Inc. 52 is the classic case establishing the law in this
area. The inventor of Listerine antiseptic conveyed the secret formula to
Warner-Lambert's predecessor in interest in exchange for a sales royalty
obligation. After seventy-five years of operating under the contract, WarnerLambert sought a declaratory judgment dissolving its royalty obligation on
grounds that the formula was no longer secret. The court denied relief
holding that, in contrast to the case of a royalty term under a patent license,
there was no public policy that prevented enforcement of a royalty obligation
after public disclosure of the licensed trade secret. 5 3 Warner-Lambert
acquired the secret formula and commercially exploited it subject to the risk
of disclosure. The inventor was entitled to receive royalties for as long as
54
Warner-Lambert used the formula.
After the Supreme Court decided Lear and before its decision in Aronson, at
least one court refused to apply the Warner-Lambert rule, reasoning that a trade
secret royalty obligation must end with public disclosure, just as a patent
royalty may not extend beyond invalidity. 5 5 In view of the assumption that
restraints would not violate the antitrust laws, since the former are less complete restraints than a
territorial allocation of markets.
50. Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 517 F. Supp. 52, 62-63 (S.D. Fla. 1981), afd, 701 F.2d 1365
(11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); Christiansen, Royalties After Life, (part 2), 5 LICENSING L. &
Bus. REP. 49, 54 (1983).
51. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), aff'd per curiam, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960); Laff v. John 0. Butler Co., 64 Il. App. 3d 603,
381 N.E.2d 423 (1st Dist. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 844 (1979); Christiansen, supra note 50, at 5152; Niegowski & McKie, Significant Recent Case Law Affecting Trade Secret/Know-how Licensing, in A.B.A.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS,

supra note 7, at 50-51.

52. 178 F. Supp. at 655.
53. Id. at 665.
54. Id. at 662; see also Laff v. John 0. Butler Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d at 617, 381 N.E.2d at 433.
55. Choisser Research Corp. v. Electronic Vision Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q 234 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Diego Co. 1972); see Christiansen, supra note 50, at 53.
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disclosure is what the trade secret licensee has really bargained for, however,
the royalty contract should be enforced. 56 The parties to a licensing contract
agree on a royalty on the basis of the revenue that they expect to be produced
57
through use of the trade secret during the period of its commercial viability.
The judiciary should not remedy mistakes in the parties' estimations.
Although a royalty obligation is enforceable beyond the time of public
disclosure without any antitrust implications (if such disclosure is not due to
the fault of either the licensor or the licensee), a licensor may violate section 1
of the Sherman Act by attempting to prevent his licensee from using the trade
secret after expiration of the license term when the secret has become publicly
known. 58 To enjoin the use of information freely available to one's
competitors would be to enforce a contract in restraint of trade.
If the subject matter of a license is protected by both patents and trade
secrets and the agreement does not clearly differentiate between the two by
providing a separate royalty for each, then there is no enforceable royalty for
the trade secrets after invalidity or expiration of the patents. 59 A hybrid
license cannot be used to extend the patent monopoly in contradiction of
Brulotte.60 This rule preserves the licensee's incentive to challenge the validity
of licensed patents upheld in Lear.6 1
Extention of the royalty obligation beyond the time of public disclosure of
the trade secret is a form of tying 6 2 because the licensor is extracting more
consideration than merely a royalty payment during the life of the secret. But
more serious and complicated antitrust controversies have arisen concerning
product tying arrangements and territorial restrictions than those involving
the royalty term of a trade secret license.
B.

Territorial Restrictions

A trade secret license may include territorial restrictions. For example the
licensee may agree to use the licensed know-how only in his home territory
and not to export products of the licensed technology or to export only to
certain assigned territories. Similarly, the licensor may agree not to operate
56. Milgrim, supra note 26.
57. Christiansen, supra note 50, at 56-57.
58. CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 1981-2 Trade Cases (CCH) 64,424 (D. Mass. 1981); Shell v.
Atco Corp., 207 U.S.P.Q. 126 (Il. Cir. Ct. 1980); Arnold, supra note 7, at 21.
59. Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fab-Con, Inc., 677 F.2d 1237, 1247 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981
(1982); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Royal Indus., 552 F.2d 309, 315, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977);
Veltman v. Norton Simon, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 774, 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Christiansen, supra note 50,
at 55; Niegowski & McKie, supra note 51, at 48-50; O'Reilly & Pula, Level Royalties in Hybrid Package
Licenses, 7 LICENSING L. & Bus. REP. 183, 188 (1984). Cf Chromalloy American Corp. v. Fischmann,
716 F.2d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 1983); Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 628 F.2d 142, 149 (D.C.

Cir. 1980) (both awarding know-how royalties under a hybrid license); Henderson, Recent
Developments in United States Licensing Law, in A.B.A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 7, at 105.
60. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (invalidating a contract to pay royalties for use of a
patented machine beyond the term of the patent). See Veltman, 425 F. Supp. at 775.
61. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) (invalidating licensee estoppel); Timely Prod. v.
Costanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 96 (D. Conn. 1979); Niegowski & McKie, supra note 51, at 47; O'Reilly &
Pula, supra note 59, at 188.
62. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33.
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in the licensee's territory and not to sell in territories reserved for his
licensees. Modern territorial restrictions in patent and trade secret licenses
are most often on a global scale, assigning one or more countries to each
party exclusively.
Patent licensing creates a de facto allocation of territories similar to that
exemplified by the above trade secret license restrictions but without the
necessity of an express agreement. When a United States firm holding both
United States and foreign patents grants exclusive licenses of its foreign
patents without licensing its United States patents, the arrangement has the
same effect as requiring his licensees to agree not to export to either the
United States or to countries where the licensor has granted other exclusive
licenses. 6 3 This automatic territorial division of markets is a result of the fact
that patent rights, and therefore patent licenses, are co-extensive with the
territory of the sovereign that granted the patent. 6 4 Patent laws have no
extraterritorial effect. 65 The ability to restrict competition by dividing
66
markets is inherent in the structure of patent law.

The same antitrust analysis has been applied regardless of the form of the
agreement, whether an exclusive patent license, or a trade secret, or hybrid
license containing explicit territorial restrictions. 6 7 A territorial restriction in
a trade secret license is valid if:
(1) the subject matter of the license is well defined, secret, and of
substantial commercial value;
(2) the restriction does not affect products unrelated to the use of
the licensed know-how;
(3) the period of the restriction is limited to the period required for
independent development of the licensed know-how; and
(4) the licensor and licensee were not competitors in any market for
68
any product affected by the license.

63. Stern, The Antitrust Status of Territorial Limitations in InternationalLicensing, 14 IDEA 580, 582
(1971). For a criticism of the view that these situations are legally equivalent, see Forman, Another
View of the Antitrust Status of Territorial Limitations in InternationalLicensing, 15 IDEA 27, 29 (1971).
64. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059, 1067 (3d Cir. 1979);
Garrett & Johnson, Antitrust Aspects of Geographical Restrictions in Patent Licensing Arrangements, 123 PLI
PATENT ANTITRUST 167, 172 (1980); Stern, supra note 63, at 583.
65. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
66. Garrett &Johnson, supra note 64, at 169; A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH, supra note
32, at 13-14; 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982) ("patentee ... may . . . convey an exclusive right under his
application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States").
67. Garrett &Johnson, supra note 64, at 172; there is controversy about whether greater or less
scrutiny applies to territorially restrictive trade secret licenses than to patent licenses; see infra Part
TV.B.
68. Barton, Limitations on Territory, Field of Use, Quantity and Price in Know-how Agreements with
Foreign Companies, 28 U. Prrr. L. REV. 195, 199 (1966); Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, supra note 49, at 74245; see ANTITRUST DIVISON, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
Cases E, F, at 30-32 (1977) [hereinafter DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATION]; 12
R. MILGRIM, supra note 3, at § 6.05[21, at 6-177.
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The most important of these factors is the commercial value of the licensed
technology. 69 If the know-how transferred under the license is unavailable
from sources other than the licensor and is necessary to enable the licensee to
enter a particular market, then the restraint on competition caused by the
territorial restriction may be held to be "merely ancillary to the main purpose
of a lawful contract." 70 Where the above-listed criteria are not satisfied,
however, it may be inferred that the trade secret license was merely a
subterfuge to effect a territorial division of the market among existing
competitors in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 7 ' Additional factors
such as the relative size of the parties, the number of competitors in the
affected markets, whether the territorial restrictions are reciprocal, and the
number of products affected by the restriction also may be considered in the
72
determination of whether the restraint is ancillary.
The ancillary restraint rule governing territorial restrictions has been
74
attributed to Fowle v. Park73 and Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons,
even though the former was decided before the Sherman Act was enacted,
and the latter states, purely in dicta, that a license for a secret process may
contain territorial restrictions without violating antitrust laws. In Fowle v.
Park, the Supreme Court enforced an agreement to divide the country into
regions where the seller and purchasers of a secret formula for a medicinal
preparation had exclusive rights to manufacture and sell the remedy. The
Court considered: (1) that the formula was secret; (2) that the purchasers had
paid valuable consideration for their rights; (3) that useful discoveries should
be rewarded; and (4) that the public should not care who sold it its
medicine. 75 The second and fourth elements of the Court's analysis would
not be acceptable justifications for territorial restrictions in a case arising on
similar facts today.
A good illustration of modern application of the ancillary restraint
doctrine is provided by United States v. E. L duPont deNemours & Co. 7 6 A French
firm, La Cellophane, granted duPont a license to manufacture and sell
cellophane using its know-how; the parties agreed not to compete in each
69.

A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH, supra note 32, at 22; Macdonald, supra note 1, at

375 (the intent of the parties is irrelevant).
70. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); see DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATION, supra note 68, at 25.

71. DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATION, supra note 68, at 22; 12 R. MILGRIM,
supra note 3, at § 6.05[2], at 6-177.
72. Adelman & Brooks, Territorial Restraints in International Technology Agreements After Topco, 17
ANTITRUST BULL. 763, 771 (1972) (A large licensor imposing territorial restrictions on a small
licensee is suspect; reciprocal territorial restrictions are also highly suspect.); Stern, supra note 63, at
584.
73. 131 U.S. 88 (1889).
74. 220 U.S. 373, 402 (1911), cited in United States v. E. duPont deNemours & Co., 118 F.
Supp. 41, 219 (D. Del. 1953), aFfd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956), and Shin Nippon Koki Co. v. Irvin Indus.,
186 U.S.P.Q. 296, 298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
75.
76.

Fowle, 131 U.S. at 97.
118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), afd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).

Page 183: Winter 1989]

TRADE SECRET LICENSING

other's territory. 7 7 The Court rejected the government's charges of per se
violation of the Sherman Act. Instead, the rule of reason was applied and the
ancillary restraint doctrine was satisfied based on the following factual
conclusions:
(1). La Cellophane developed a successful proven process for the commercial
manufacture of cellophane. This process was secret, novel and of commercial value
(2). When duPont learned of cellophane, it entered upon the manufacture of the
product. It was not then engaged in any business which would cause it to fear the
competition of cellophane. Rather, it desired to diversify its business and take the
business risk of entering this new field. La Cellophane, in turn, had no reason to fear
duPont's competition for duPont had neither the necessary knowledge nor technical
experience to compete in cellophane. No one else in the United States was making
cellophane or seeking to get La Cellophane's process. It was not practicable to enter
without having access to the French process .... 78

The Court found that "neither party was motivated by anticompetitive
considerations," and that it was only natural for the licensor to promise not to
compete with the jointly created enterprise in
Court opined that the Sherman Act should
introduction of new business into American
legitimately restrict competition that would not

its exclusive territory. 79 The
not serve to discourage the
markets. 8 0 The parties may
have existed but for the trade

secret license.8 1
Subsequent cases have held that the critical issue in determining the
ancillarity of territorial restrictions is the existence and extent of know-how
possessed exclusively by the licensor.8 2 The court in A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v.
Monsanto Co. 8 3 viewed a non-competition clause as less burdensome than the
8 4
competitive disability posed by not having access to the secret technology.
85
Territorial restrictions were viewed in Shin Nippon Koki Co. v. Irvin Industries
as an incentive to license and an assurance of an adequate reward for creative
skill and diligence.8 6 The courts in both of these cases distinguished the
"cartel cases": United States v. General Electric Co. (Lamp), 8 7 United States v.
77. La Cellophane granted duPont exclusive rights under its cellophane patents and know-how
in North and Central America and duPont granted La Cellophane exclusive rights in the rest of the
world under any improvement patents and know-how. Id. at 58.
78. Id. at 218.
79. Id. at 219.
80. Id.

81. Similarly, in Foundry Servs. v. Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y), rev'd on other
grounds, 206 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1953), the court upheld an agreement between the licensor and
licensee not to sell outside their respective territories having found that they were not competitors,
id. at 860, and that their primary purpose was the transfer of know-how, id. at 861.

82.

A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1968) (affirming denial

of temporary injunction to stay arbitration pending judicial resolution of licensee's claim of violation
of section 1, Sherman Act); Shin Nippon Koki Co. v. Irvin Indus., 186 U.S.P.Q. 296, 298-99 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1975) (also denying a stay of arbitration pending resolution of licensee's Sherman Act
section 1 complaint).
83. 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
84. Id. at 715 (quoting Macdonald, supra note 1, at 354).
85. 186 U.S.P.Q 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
86. Id. at 298.
87. 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
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Timken Roller Bearing Co., 8 8 and United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries.89 The
Monsanto court stated:
In these cases complicated world-wide networks of cross-licensing agreements were
struck down as subterfuges enabling the participants to divide markets and fix prices
while avoiding antitrust laws. The courts found a lack of any true trade secrets or that
what secrets existed were not sufficiently substantial to support restraints of such
magnitude. The
parties' intent, principally to restrain competition, was regarded as a
90
critical factor.

In General Electric (Lamp), the government challenged agreements by which
General Electric exchanged patents and know-how with foreign companies
while banning manufacture, sale, and sale for use in the United States by its
foreign licensees and reserving foreign markets for themself. The court
rejected General Electric's ancillary restraint defense because there was no
clear evidence of what the alleged know-how consisted of, or whether it was
embodied in all the products covered by the licenses. 9 1 Furthermore, the
evidence revealed that, were it not for the territorial restrictions, General
Electric would have faced competition from its licensees. 9 2 Similarly, the
courts in Timken Roller Bearing and Imperial Chemical Industries found that the
licensed know-how was not sufficiently secret or valuable to support the
territorial division of markets arranged by the parties, and that the real
93
purpose of the agreements was to restrain competition.
The following arguments made in support of and opposition to
recognizing an ancillarity defense in the cartel cases raised the issue of
whether the same antitrust doctrine should apply to trade secret and patent
license restrictions. In General Electric (Lamp), the government argued that a
know-how licensor is entitled to less freedom than a patent licensor to impose
license restrictions that restrain competition because of the statutory patent
grant. 94 On the other hand, the defendant in Timken Roller Bearing contended
that a know-how licensor should be afforded greater liberty because no statute
provided him or his licensee protection against public discovery. 95 The
differences between patent and trade secret protection, which may justify a
different rule regarding territorial restrictions in licensing agreements, are
discussed below in the context of a broader economic analysis of the rationale
behind the antitrust limitations. 9 6 In the next section, this note examines
88. 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), modified, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
89. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The court in Shin Nippon also distinguished two cases:
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947)
(primarily involving patent licenses), and United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989
(S.D.N.Y. 1948) (also involving primarily patent licenses). Shin Nippon Koki Co. v. Irvin Indus., Inc.,
186 U.S.P.Q. 296, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
90. A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 715 (9th Cir. 1968).
91.

General Elec. Co. (Lamp), 82 F. Supp. at 846.

92.
93.

Id. at 847.
United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1949); Imperial

Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. at 528.

94. 82 F. Supp. at 846.
95. 83 F. Supp. at 312.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 126-30.
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another antitrust limitation on the freedom of trade secret owners to impose
restrictive covenants on licensees.
C.

Tying Arrangements

A tying arrangement is an agreement wherein sale of a product, called the
tying product, is conditioned on concomitant purchase of another different
product or service, called the tied product. 97 Such arrangements may restrain
competition in the tied product market by affording the party imposing the
restriction leverage in the sale of the tied product that he would not otherwise
enjoy. 98 A sale conditioned on the purchase of another unrelated product is a
contract in restraint of trade if the seller has "sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the
market for the tied product .... 99
A trade secret owner may impose a tying arrangement on his licensees by
refusing to license his technology unless the licensee agrees to purchase
certain inputs. A tying provision in a trade secret license can be sustained
only if the licensor can convincingly show that the arrangement was necessary
to protect the licensor's goodwill in the product of the licensed secret process
and that technical product specifications would not suffice to protect that
goodwill.' 0 0 The case law concerning tying arrangements both in trade secret
licenses and in contracts for the sale of equipment embodying a trade secret
uniformly embraces the following holding: Trade secret protection of the
tying product is strong support for the legal conclusion that the seller has
sufficient economic power in the tying product market to restrain competition
in the tied product market. The cases also show, however, that certain
legitimate business interests, such as protection of goodwill, safety
considerations, and assurance of the success of a fledgling enterprise, can
justify a tying arrangement and rebut a presumptive violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.
The defendant in United States v. JerroldElectronics Corporation10 ' developed
equipment and know-how for the installation of community television antenna
systems for communities remote from the broadcasting station. 0 2 Jerrold
Electronics agreed to sell and install antenna systems on the condition that
the purchasing community accept a service contract. The Department of
Justice charged Jerrold with a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The
court held that there were legitimate business reasons to justify the tying of
97. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5-6 (1958) (a tying arrangement may also
be accomplished by requiring the purchaser to agree not to purchase the tied product from any other
seller).
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id. (citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)); see also Macdonald,
supra note 1, at 361.
100. DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATION, supra note 68, Case F, at 35.
101.
187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afd per curiam on other grounds, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
102. Id. at 549-52. The system involved construction of a large receiving tower at the highest
point in the community and installation of a cable system on existing utility poles to amplify and
transmit the signals.
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service contracts at the development stage ofJerrold's business, but that these
reasons did not continue to justify the arrangement after the growth and
03
establishment of the enterprise.1
Jerrold instituted its policy of mandatory purchasing of engineering
services at a time when the antenna system had been installed in only a few
communities, technical problems still needed to be solved, and the success of
the newly developed system was highly uncertain. Thus, the following facts
justified the competitive restraint: (1) the equipment was sensitive and
unstable, requiring experienced engineers; (2) payment for the system was
made contingent on its success; (3) the utility companies objected to having
inexperienced workers install cable on their utility poles; and (4) Jerrold's
0 4
reputation was at stake during the development period of the industry.1
The court found that there was no less restrictive alternative to a mandatory
service contract to enablejerrold to survive the "transitory disloyalties" of its
05
initial customers. '
The defendant failed, however, to sustain its burden of showing the
continued need for its policy. The court rejected Jerrold's contention that the
tying arrangement was necessary to maintain profitability of sales: Jerrold
argued that success of the system depended upon the head end equipment for
which development costs were high; yet competitors could reap the benefit of
10 6
Jerrold's ingenuity through the more profitable sale of amplifiers.
A similar free-rider defense was rejected by the court in In re Data General
Corp. Antitrust Litigation,'0 7 where the defendant attempted to support the
reasonableness of tying the purchase of hardware to its computer software
licenses.' 0 8 Data General argued that competitors could take unfair
advantage of the defendant's software research and development costs by
selling hardware that was compatible with the defendant's software. The
court held that Data General was required to resort to less restrictive
alternatives, such as price restructuring, in order to recoup its investment in
software development.' 0 9
103. Id. at 557-58. The same conclusion was reached with regard to Jerrold's policies of selling
only complete equipment packages and retaining the rights to veto the purchaser's installation of
additional equipment not purchased from Jerrold; however, an absolute prohibition of such purchase
from other dealers was held invalid.
104. Id. at 556.
105. Id. at 557.
106. Id. at 560-61.
107. 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (cross-motions for summary judgment denied), 529 F.
Supp. 801 (1981) (granting defendant Data General's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto
and conditionally granting defendant's motion for a new trial), aff'd sub nom. Digidyne Corp. v. Data
General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
108. Data General's software license agreement prohibited the licensee from using the software
with any central processing unit ("CPU") other than its Nova unit. Data General also required its
software licensees to purchase a minimum amount of hardware or else pay a license surcharge and
required its CPU purchasers to buy a minimum amount of memory equipment. In re Data General
Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
109. Id. at 1121-22; this holding was affirmed in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d
at 1343. The district court also rejected the defendant's asserted business justifications for the tying
arrangement: customer dissatisfaction with incompatibility and the need to protect goodwill by
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Jerrold Electronics asserted the same business reasons for tying a service
contract to the sale of antenna equipment inJerroldElectronics Corp. v. Westcoast
BroadcastingCo., 110 namely the need to insure proper functioning of the system
and protection of goodwill."'I The court found, however, that the real
purpose of the tie was to enable Jerrold to control sales and to derive
t2
additional revenue from use of the system; these purposes were illegal."
The court's conclusion was related to its finding that Jerrold had economic
power in the market for antenna equipment because Jerrold was the only
supplier for some components.' 3 Jerrold's policy enabled it to exclude any
competitor from setting up a community antenna system." l 4 Thus, the
' 5
Northern Pacific Railway test of an illegal tying arrangement was satisfied.
Similarly, in In re Data General"1 6 the economic power of the defendant was
a decisive issue. " 7 While a patent or copyright would give rise to a rebuttable
presumption of sufficient power in the tying market to coerce purchase of the
tied product," 8 such a presumption has not been applied where the tying
product is protected by a trade secret." 9 However, evidence of a trade secret
is probative of the uniqueness of a product and may form the basis for a jury
conclusion that the defendant has sufficient market power to impose the
tie.' 20 In contrast to a monopolization case under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, the plaintiff is not required to demonstrate the defendant's power to
control prices in the entire tying product market. Rather, in the case of a per
se tying violation of section 1, the plaintiff need only show that the defendant
had market power sufficient to impose non-competitive prices or burdensome
restrictions on an appreciable number of consumers. A reasonable jury
conclusion that the defendant possessed market power may be based on
evidence that the tying product, computer software, could not have been
minimizing service problems. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. at 112223.
110. 341 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965).
111. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 341 F.2d at 663.
112. Id. at 663-64. Cf Polytechnic Data Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1973)
(where the court accepted seemingly insubstantial business justifications, namely the promotion of
safety and assurance of the integrity and proper functioning of the defendant's equipment, to uphold
Xerox's refusal to allow the plaintifrs copy controller keys to be installed on its leased copy
machines).
113. JerroldElec.Corp., 341 F.2d at 661.
114. Id. at 663.
115. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
116. 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1980), afd sub nom., Digidyne Corp. v. Data General
Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
117. On cross-motions for summary judgment, there was no genuine issue of material fact on
other issues, and trial was restricted to the question of economic power. Id.
118. Id. at 1112, afd, 734 F.2d at 1344; United States v. Loew's, Inc., 373 U.S. 38 (1962); accord
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc. (II), 429 U.S. 610, 619 n.12 (1977);Jack Winter, Inc.
v. Koratron Co., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 1, 61 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (the requisite economic power may be
presumed from the patent on the tying product).
119. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. at 1114; see Helein, Software Lockin and Antitrust Tying Arrangements: The Lessons of Data General, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 329, 335 (1985).
120. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. at 1115.
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produced without misappropriating the defendant's trade secrets, infringing
his copyright, or making a substantial investment in software development. 21
In addition to the trade secret barrier and copyright protection, software
consumer lock-in was relied on by the court in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General
Corp. 122 to support its conclusion that consumers were forced to purchase
unwanted tied hardware: Original equipment manufacturers who purchased
Data General's central processing unit ("CPU") and operations software
developed applications software that functioned only with Data General's
operations software.' 23 Such manufacturers were forced to purchase Data
General's operations software and the tied CPU (or pay a license surcharge)
for every system they sold.124 The software consumer lock-in theory has been
2 5
criticized, however, as inconsistent with the realities of the software market.1
Thus, the trade secret owner is prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act
from conditioning the licensing or sale of his trade secret on the purchase of
unrelated products or services. Such a trade secret licensing restriction will
be acceptable only if there are legitimate business reasons for the tie which
exist throughout the period when the restriction is in effect, and if no less
restrictive alternative is available to enable the trade secret owner to earn a
profit from the use or sale of his trade secret.
Having examined the three most controversial trade secret licensing
restrictions, an indefinite royalty term, a territorial restriction, and a tying
provision, this note concludes with an economic analysis of the law in this
area.
V
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The following section will explore the extent to which previous economic
evaluations of the status of patent licensing restrictions under the antitrust
laws apply to royalty term, tying arrangements, and territorial limitations in
trade secret licenses. This analysis is preceded by a discussion of the extent to
which the established antitrust restrictions on patent licensing contracts
should generally be applied to trade secret licenses.
The Department of Justice has taken the position that stricter antitrust
standards will be applied to trade secret license restrictions than are applied
to the corresponding provisions in patent licenses.' 2 6 The justification for
this attitude is that trade secrets lack the congressional mandate that gives
patents special antitrust immunity. Stricter antitrust scrutiny of trade secret
license restrictions has also been supported on the ground that trade secrets
121. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473
U.S. 908 (1985).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1343.

125.

Helein, supra note 119, at 339.

126.

DOJ ANTITRUST

GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL OPERATION,

supra note 68, Case F, at 33-34.
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give the public no quid pro quo in the form of a substantial contribution to
the body of useful industrial information, while patents add to the public's
knowledge at the expiration of the patent. 127 These arguments ignore the
true economic purpose behind both patent and trade secret protection: to
prevent the uncompensated appropriation of the valuable innovations of
competing firms in order to provide a potential for return on their
expenditures for research, development, and information gathering.
Although trade secrets lack a congressional mandate, the Supreme Court
recognized the contribution of state trade secret law to the stimulation of
innovation in Kewanee Oil 128 and Aronson. 129 Furthermore, in contrast to the
Department ofJustice position, the lack of federally protected exclusive rights
in the case of trade secrets actually lessens the possibility of an abuse of power
when negotiating licensing agreements.' 3 0 The trade secret owner has a
weaker bargaining position because he is unable to demonstrate the
advantages of his information without disclosing the secret and because he
cannot threaten an infringement suit if the potential licensee obtains and uses
the industrial information by other legitimate means. Whereas a patent has
presumptive validity and economic value, a trade secret has no presumed
validity. However, once the value of a trade secret has been demonstrated,
the antitrust analysis of license terms should be the same as is applied to
patent licenses.
The test of validity of patent licensing restrictions under section 1 of the
Sherman Act advocated by Professor Bowman of the Chicago school of
antitrust critics is equally applicable to trade secret licenses. This test asks
whether the restrictions imposed extend the patentee's market power beyond
the proper scope of the patent.' 3' According to Professor Bowman, the scope
of the patentee's exclusive rights is limited by the competitive superiority that
the patented idea affords; therefore, it is impossible for the patent licensor to
bargain for a broader monopoly without engaging in horizontal mergers, or
32
restrictions that would also benefit the licensee.'
If one accepts the premise that neither patents nor trade secrets
necessarily confer a monopoly, the market power extension test or
permissible licensing restrictions may be applied to trade secret licenses as
well. The power conferred by either a patent or a trade secret depends on the
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
Analysis,

Stern, supra note 63, at 590.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974).
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 3, at § 6.05[2], at 6-186 to 6-187.
W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 54 (1973).
Id. at 55, 64; see Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic
76 YALE L.J. 267, 313-14 (1966). Professor Baxter proposes a more limited test:
[A] patentee is entitled to extract monopoly income by restricting utilization of his
invention, notwithstanding that utilization of other goods and services are [sic] consequently
restricted, provided that in each case he confines the restriction to his invention as narrowly
and specifically as the technology of his situation and the practicalities of his situation
permit.

Id. at 313.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 52: No. I

commercial value of the protected invention or information. Many patents
are trivial innovations with many competing substitutes. 3 3 Furthermore,
patents for improvements or modifications of a patent invention may be
worthless without access to the underlying patent. Therefore, the monopoly
power held by either the patent or the trade secret proprietor must be
measured not merely by the legal rights provided but more importantly by the
34
comparative advantage of the protected invention or information.
Professor Bowman argues that this comparative advantage gives the patent
holder a fixed sum of monopoly power. If valid, this argument applies equally
to a trade secret. Accordingly, any vertical restriction which the patent or
trade secret owner imposes on his licensee is merely an effort to reap the full
13 5
value of the protected innovation.
Professor Kaplow of the Harvard school of antitrust analysis criticizes this
view on grounds that it ignores the monopoly loss caused by restrictive
license provisions. 3 6 Instead, a ratio test is proposed: With respect to the
ratio of the patentee's reward attributable to the license restriction to the
resulting monopoly loss to society from permitting the restriction, the smaller
37
the ratio, the greater is the likelihood that the restriction is anticompetitive.1
Application of this test requires a consideration of: (1) the extent to which
monopoly loss is converted into profit for the patent owner without any
accompanying misallocation of resources or inefficiency; (2) the portion of the
monopoly profit that accrues to the patentee and the portion that is diverted
to third parties who are undeserving of any reward for innovation; and (3) the
degree to which firms are able to predict and appreciate the potential profits
from a particular restrictive practice, so that permitting it under the antitrust
138
laws increases the incentive to innovate.
Both the Harvard and Chicago school critics agree that patent law is
needed to stimulate investment in inventive activity. Without the guarantee
of exclusive rights to exploit the results of an investment in innovation, the
innovator can capture only a small portion of the value of the innovation,
probably not even a large enough return to cover his costs.' 3

9

The same

rationale supports judicial recognition of trade secret licenses. Although
investment in the development of ideas and information that is not patentable
may not be as great as that required to invent a novel and non-obvious
product or process, the market power afforded by enforcement of the trade
secret laws is appropriately less. The antitrust limitations on trade secret
licensing must be determined in view of the goal of ensuring that the
133. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 33 (J.
Palmer guest ed. 1986).
134. See id. at 37.
135. W. BOWMAN, supra note 131, at 55.
136. Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1851-52
(1984).
137. Id. at 1831-32.
138. Id. at 1835-39.
139. Id. at 1823; Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 450, 451 (1969);
W. BOWMAN, supra note 131, at 32; Baxter, supra note 132, at 268-69.
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developers of valuable information are able to recoup their capital
investment. The net benefit to society should be considered by taking into
account both the social value of an increase in inventive activity and the social
cost of permitting imposition of restrictive provisions in license
agreements.1 40 This section now proceeds to a discussion of the antitrust
validity of royalty term, tying, and territorial restrictions in trade secret
licenses in view of the criticisms of legal doctrines in the patent licensing area.
A.

Tying Arrangements and Royalty Term

In both the patent and trade secret licensing areas the courts have
accepted the leverage theory behind holding tying arrangements illegal under
either section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act.14 1 The
Supreme Court held in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. UniversalFilm Manufacturing
Co. 142 that a license to use a patented film projector only with the patentee's
unpatented film had the effect of "extending the power to the owner of the
patent to fix the price to the public of the unpatented supplies as effectively as
he may fix the price on the patented machine." 14 3 Mr. Justice Holmes, in
dissent, advanced a counterargument that has been supported by the Chicago
school critics:
The supposed contravention of public interest [posed by the tying arrangement]
sometimes is stated as an attempt to extend the patent law to unpatented articles,

which of course it is not, and more accurately as a possible domination to be
established by such means. But the domination is one only to the extent of the desirefor the...
[patented machine], and if the owner prefers to keep the [patented machine] unless you

will buy his ... [unpatented supplies], I cannot see in allowing him the right to do so,
4
anything more than an ordinary incident of ownership ....

Holmes' argument is based on the premise that the patentee has a fixed sum
of monopoly power attributable to the competitive superiority of his patented
invention and that this monopoly cannot be extended to markets for
complementary products. If the patentee's goal is to maximize profits, then it
is in his best interest to ensure that all complementary products are supplied
to his licensees at a competitive price without output restrictions. Only if this
condition exists will the licensee be able to use the patented machine or
45
process efficiently and the licensor be able to maximize royalty revenue.
140. See Kaplow, supra note 136, at 1828; cf. Turner, supra note 139, at 459, 463 (the validity of
patent licensing restrictions under antitrust laws has insignificant effect on the patent reward and
incentive to innovate because of extreme uncertainty with regard to any prospective return on
investment in research and development).
141. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits the conditioning of a sale or lease of goods upon the
buyer's or lessee's agreement not to deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller or lessor, where
such condition may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1982). This provision applies to a lessee's agreement to purchase supplies exclusively from the
lessor, which has the same effect. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457
(1922).
142. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
143. Id. at 517 (non-compliance with patent license restriction did not constitute patent
infringement).
144. Id. at 520 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
145. W. BOWMAN, supra note 131, at 72.
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Otherwise a monopoly price charged for the tied product would reduce the
demand for the tying patented product or process. 146 Thus, Professor
Bowman postulates that a tie-in results in no greater profit for the licensor
than could be achieved by setting the optimum royalty; the tie-in determines
the identity of the seller, but does not increase the price of the combined
product nor restrict output of the tied product. 1 4 7 The licensor of a patented
machine may require the licensee to purchase supplies of unpatented
complementary products from the licensor as a device to measure the
licensee's use of the machine.14 8 In this way, the licensor may absorb some of
the licensee's risk concerning the profitability of the machine over other
technologies.
The fixed sum argument would also support a tying restriction in a trade
secret license. The comparative advantage of a trade secret is determined not
by the scope of patent claims, but by the relative secrecy, ease of reverse
engineering, cost of development, and commercial utility of the trade secret.
Following Professor Bowman's argument, the monopoly power offered by this
comparative advantage is not improperly leveraged into markets not
protected by the trade secret when a tying arrangement is imposed on
licensees. The measuring device and risk-sharing functions of tying may be
even more important in the trade secret license because of the uncertainty in
value. Thus, Professor Bowman would not require Jerrold Electronics and
Data General to defend their respective tying arrangements based on
legitimate business justifications, because the revenue they derived from the
tied service contracts and central processing units was attributable to the
competitive advantage of Jerrold's antenna system and Data General's
computer software, respectively.
Royalty term extension is also part of the leveraging fallacy according to
Professor Bowman's perspective. 49 He would disagree with the notion that a
contractual obligation to pay royalties beyond the term of a patent is an
attempt to tie unprotected use to protected use of a patented machine or
process.' 50 Rather, the licensor and licensee have agreed on a price and
method of payment that reflects the value of the patented idea to each of
them. Applying Bowman's criticism to trade secret licensing, there is no
leveraging involved when a licensee agrees to pay royalties to the trade secret
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 173 (1976).
147. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE LJ. 19, 21-23 (1957). Tying
arrangements have also been defended by Professor Bowman on grounds that they serve as a
metering device to enable the licensor to measure the licensee's use of a patented machine. The
greater the licensee's demand for supplies to be used with the machine, the greater the value of the
machine to the licensee. Knowing this value enables the licensor to discriminate with respect to the
royalty charged to his licensees, thereby increasing output. W. BOWMAN, supra note 131, at 55.
148. W. BOWMAN, supra note 131, at 55.
149. Id. at 232.
150. Id. at 233. Bowman criticizes the majority opinion in Brulotte v. Thys, 379 U.S. 29, 36 n.1
(1964) (agreeing with the dissent's point of view that a royalty contract longer than the patent term
was in economic substance no different than charging 25 cents per load to use a washing machine for
which the patent had expired).
146.
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owner for a fixed term, regardless of subsequent disclosure. Accordingly, the
royalty agreements in Brulotte and Aronson are not illegal per se.
Professor Kaplow criticizes the application of the fixed sum argument to
tying arrangements as overly simplistic. He maintains that there is no clear
distinction between the licensor's attempt to maximize profits and his attempt
to extend monopoly power, and that the costs and benefits of restrictions
must be assessed. 15 1 According to Professor Kaplow, it may be feasible for a
licensor to extend his monopoly power through a tying arrangement, because
the tie may result in only small short-run losses from diminished demand for
the tying product.' 5 2 Furthermore, licensors are motivated to impose tie-ins
by the potential for effecting long-run changes in the market structure
through foreclosure and the erection of entry barriers. 53 Professor Kaplow
teaches that antitrust law should not exclude the possibility that a tying
arrangement will be imposed by a firm with a patent or trade secret
54

monopoly. 1

The courts in Jerrold Electronics and Data General implicitly accepted the
plausibility of leverage theory by applying a per se rule against tying
arrangements.' 55 Accordingly, Jerrold's tying of a service contract to the sale
of community antenna systems may have had the effect of extendingJerrold's
power into the service market. Although Jerrold had to forego equipment
sales to purchasers who were willing to repair their own equipment, 56 the
company probably expected to make up for those losses with revenue from
service contracts. Similarly, Data General attempted to use its market power
in the software market to enter the hardware market. Yet neither court made
an effort to analyze the probability of successful leveraging, or to weigh the
benefits and burdens of permitting the tie-in. Professor Kaplow indicates that
there are several factors overlooked by the fixed sum theory that may enable a
tying arrangement to succeed in achieving monopoly extension.' 57 It is
inconsistent with leverage theory to permit only those tying arrangements
imposed by nascent industries without an analysis of the economic possibility
of monopoly extension under the circumstances of the case. On the other
hand, a per se rule against tying, with a limited exception for cases where the
licensor can demonstrate necessity in the developmental stages of the firm, is
a rule that gives greater certainty and avoids judicial inquiry into the degree of
market power afforded by a trade secret. Furthermore, this exception should
151. Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 520-23 (1985).
"Just as it matters where the terrorist leaves the stick of dynamite, it also matters how a firm chooses
to exercise the power that it has." Id. at 525.
152. Id. at 526.
153. Id. at 528-30. The possibility of formative entry barriers caused by trade secret monopoly is
small in comparison to the potential barriers posed by a patent because of the difference in the
extent of legal protection.
154. Id. at 555.
155. The court in Jerrold Electronics made an exception to the per se rule for ties that had a
legitimate business purpose, and the leveraging theory was not wholly rejected. 187 F. Supp. at 556.
156. Id. at 557.
157. One factor, for example, is the inability of competitors and customers of the firm imposing a
tie to resist the arrangement. Kaplow, supra note 151, at 531-33.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY

PROBLEMS

[Vol. 52: No. I

cover those situations in which the feasibility of market leverage is the least
and the justification for permitting tying is the greatest.
B.

Territorial Restrictions

An economic analysis of the appropriate antitrust limitations on
territorially exclusive patent licenses is also applicable to know-how
licenses.' 58 While the trade secret licensor may impose an explicit restriction
regarding the territories in which his licensee may exploit the licensed
technology, the patent owner can achieve the same result by granting
exclusive licenses under a number of national patents for the same invention.
Professor Bowman's view of this practice is similar to his stance on tying
arrangements. Territorially restrictive licensing, like other vertical restraints,
is merely a means of maximizing the return on the investment in invention.
The ability to exploit the differential advantages that the patented technology
59
affords in different territories is inherent in the patent right.'
Critics of territorially restrictive licensing view the practice as posing a
60
dangerous potential for effecting a cartel-like division of the market.'
Although the patent or trade secret owner receives his reward from royalties
from his exclusive licensees as well as from exploitation of his innovation in
his own exclusive territory, some of the reward is shifted to his licensees who
enjoy monopoly profits in their respective territories. Thus, permitting a
territorial division of the market defeats one of the purposes of protecting
invention by rewarding those who have not contributed to the investment in
innovation.' 6 ' It is recognized that the net negative effect on social welfare
caused by territorial cartelization increases as the commercial value of the
licensed technology decreases. 62 Professors Turner and Baxter acknowledge
that the licensor's ability to charge a different royalty in different territories
has a negligible harmful effect on social welfare, 163 or may even have the
beneficial effect of increasing overall exploitation of the licensed
technology. 164 They propose a rule that once a patentee has granted a single
territorial license, he must be compelled to grant similar licenses to all
qualified applicants.' 6 5 Under this rule, the licensor would be provided with
adequate incentive to innovate through royalties and through his ability to
158. In addition to the economic debate concerning the appropriate status of territorial patent
licensing, a legal debate centers around the intent and effect of 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982). See supra
note 66; see also Baxter, supra note 132, at 349-52; Gibbons, Domestic TerritorialRestrictions in Patent
Transactions and the Antitrust Laws, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 895-900 (1966); Wheeler, A
Reexamination of Antitrust Law and Exclusive TerritorialGrants by Patentees, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 642, 643-50

(1971).
159. W. BOWMAN, supra note 131, at 56.
160. Baxter, supra note 132, at 347; Turner, supra note 139, at 471.
161. See Kaplow, supra note 136, at 1835-37.
162. Baxter, supra note 132, at 347. The courts have accepted this view in trade secret licensing
cases; see, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953).
163. Baxter, supra note 132, at 347.
164. Turner, supra note 139, at 471.
165. Baxter, supra note 132, at 347; Turner, supra note 139, at 474.
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exploit the invention in his own exclusive territory. 166 Turner would make an
exception to the compulsory licensing rule for the case where, absent
territorial exclusivity, neither the owner nor any potential licensee would
16 7
exploit the technology.
Another critic, Professor Gibbons, has taken a view of territorial
168
restrictions more consistent with the courts' ancillary restraint doctrine.
This view recognized that, under certain conditions, the benefits of licensing
may outweigh the danger of cartelization. Professor Gibbons would permit
territorial restrictions in patent licenses so long as: (1) the restriction is
limited to a short development period; (2) the patented technology has a high
degree of novelty; (3) the restraint covers only activities protected by the
patent; (4) the licensee is a small firm in view of the capital requirements for
the industry; (5) and only the making and use of the invention, and not the
distribution of end products, is territorially restricted. Territorial licensing is
justified under these conditions by the need to induce potential licensees to
invest capital in the production and distribution of new technology,' 6 9 but
70
only if no firm would accept a license without a territorial restriction.
Professor Gibbons' proposal has been criticized on grounds that licensing
may be prohibited where the parties need territorial restrictions in order to
reduce the risks of developing and marketing a new product.' 7 ' Where the
success and commercial value of new technology is relatively certain, capital is
available to finance start-up costs; but where further research and
development is necessary and ultimate success is uncertain, territorial
restrictions are needed to entice the prospective licensee to undertake the
investment risk. 172 In this situation, mere protection against competition
from other manufacturers and users in the same territory is an insufficient
risk-taking incentive; the patent must promise potential rewards greater than
the going rate of return. 73 Professor Wheeler suggests a rule permitting the
patentee to issue a single territorially exclusive license, so that the
exploitation of new technology would be assured while the danger of
74
cartelization would remain minimal.1
166. Baxter, supra note 132, at 347.
167. Turner, supra note 139, at 474; see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH, supra note 32,
at 12.
168. Gibbons, supra note 158, at 895.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 901. Professor Gibbons' proposal is the basic approach taken by the European
Economic Community, where firms have used the national patent laws to create market division; by
issuing a regulation that permitted territorially restrictive licenses, the Community sought to "make
patentees more willing to grant licenses and licensees more inclined to undertake the investment
required to manufacture, use and put on the market a new product or to use a new process."
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2349/84, preamble 12 (Oj. No. L 219, Aug. 16, 1984, at 15), 2
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2747, at 1958. The regulation prohibits a license provision requiring
the parties to refuse to sell to users or resellers who would market licensed products in reserved
territories. Id., 2747E, at 1958.
171. Wheeler, supra note 158, at 651, 657-62.
172. Id. at 657-58.
173. Id. at 658.
174. Id. at 665.
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The single license rule should be applied in trade secret licensing cases
involving territorial restrictions. By communicating secret know-how to a
single licensee and granting him the exclusive right to exploit it in his
territory, the trade secret owner restrains competition to no greater extent
than if he had kept the information to himself. The parties should not be
required to demonstrate that the subject matter of the license has significant
commerical value so long as only a single territory is protected by the
agreement, because commercial value is uncertain in those situations where
the licensee's territorial exclusivity is needed most. However, once the trade
secret owner attempts to divide the market to a greater extent by imposing a
reciprocal restriction on the licensee-prohibiting him from exporting the
products of a secret process-the agreement should be condemned per se
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 1 75 Such reciprocal territorial restrictions
cannot be justified by the need to protect fledgling firms that introduce new
business into a territory. If the licensee is so weak that he needs exclusive
territorial rights in order to survive the development period of the industry,
76
then reciprocal protection against the licensee's exports is unreasonable.1
The Court in duPont (Cellophane) upheld reciprocal territorial restrictions
based on a finding that duPont was "struggling to establish plain cellophane
as a competing product in the flexible packaging market" at the time of the
license agreement. 77 This reasoning may have justified duPont's exclusive
rights in North and Central America, but did not justify La Cellophane's
exclusive rights in the rest of the world.
Furthermore, exclusive territorial rights for the licensee under trade secret
licenses should be limited to a period needed for further research and
development and to establish the new industry. This period can only be
determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the licensed subject matter.
When a single territorially exclusive license is granted by the licensor, it is not
necessary for the courts to determine whether the licensed technology is
novel, secret, or precisely defined in order for the agreement to pass antitrust
scrutiny. The parties' own economic interests will ensure that these
requirements are met. Applying this rule to trade secret licenses in order to
permit a single exclusive territory, as Professor Wheeler has suggested for
patent licenses, will avoid the necessity of judicial inquiry into whether

technological innovations are substantial enough to support ancillary
restraints and therefore lead to a just and economically reasonable application
of the antitrust laws.

175. The Department ofJustice has also taken the position that reciprocal territorial restraints in
know-how licenses facilitate cartelization and permanent market division. DOJ ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATION, supra note 68, Case F, at 34. An agreement by the trade secret licensee

not to export products of the licensed know-how to other licensees' territories should be condemned
for the same reasons.

176.
177.

Adelman & Brooks, supra note 72, at 769.
United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. at 220.
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VI
CONCLUSION

Trade secrecy affords limited protection for industrial information;
nevertheless, for certain types of innovations, the trade secret may be a useful
and more desirable form of protection against uncompensated appropriation.
A trade secret owner may agree to disclose his know-how and permit a party
to utilize it in his business in exchange for royalty payments.
Such
agreements are enforceable even if the trade secret becomes known to
competitors of the licensee. The trade secret licensor and licensee may also
agree to restrict the territory in which industrial information may be exploited
or to require that the licensee purchase certain complementary goods
exclusively from the licensor. These restrictive clauses implicate the antitrust
laws and may not always be enforced. Territorially restrictive licenses may be
a subterfuge to divide product markets among competitors in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. A tying arrangement may be an attempt by the
licensor to extend the market power afforded by the trade secret into
complementary product markets. Both restrictions are generally condemned
under the Sherman Act unless the territorial limitation is merely ancillary to
an agreement to transfer substantial know-how or the tying requirement has
compelling business purposes related to the establishment of a new industry
exploiting the trade secret. By analogy to previous analyses of the antitrust
limitations on similar restrictions in patent licenses, the objective of antitrust
regulation of trade secret licensing should be to balance the need to secure an
adequate reward for the developers of valuable commercial information
against the tendency of license restrictions to tax social welfare through
monopoly. With regard to tying arrangements, this balancing requires an
evaluation of the market power of the trade secret and the ability of the
licensor to leverage complementary product markets through foreclosure or
erection of entry barriers. The antitrust policy regarding territorial
restrictions in trade secret licenses should seek to weigh the risks of
cartelization against the need to encourage the exploitation of valuable
technology in new markets.
Elizabeth Miller

